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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the relation between collective action and performance for a 
case study in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali. As a result of irrigation 
management transfer at tertiary level, farmers are now collectively responsible for 
water supply to the tertiary block, water allocation within the tertiary block, coordination 
of the cropping calendar and infrastructure maintenance. The research is based on a 
field study including about 300 farmers from 36 tertiary blocks and 9 villages. First, the 
different aspects of both collective action and performance are measured through 
developing indicators. Regarding collective action, these indicators measure 
coordination of the cropping calendar, maintenance of tertiary infrastructure, 
coordination of water demand at tertiary level, and coordination of water allocation 
within the tertiary block. The performance indicators incorporate the viewpoint of the 
irrigation scheme’s management as well as farmers and are irrigation efficiency, 
easiness of irrigation, occurrence of conflicts and agricultural productivity. Next, the 
relation between collective action and irrigation performance is quantified using 
statistical models. The main finding is that not all aspects of performance are affected 
by collective action, and when they do, not by all aspects of collective action. The 
choice of indicators when studying collective action is thus of primary importance. In 
the Office du Niger, coordination of water supply and demand and coordination of 
water allocation affect efficiency and easiness of irrigation respectively. Given the 
increasing importance of these aspects of performance, they must form the primary 
focus of efforts to enhance collective action. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays, the premise is that through collective action, local users can increase the 
performance of common-pool resources (Ostrom 1999, Dietz et al. 2003), such as 
collective irrigation schemes. A growing number of papers study the emergence of 
collective action in irrigation (for example Aggarwal 2000, Bardhan 2000, Ray and 
Williams 2002, Meinzen-dick et al. 2002, Rinaudo 2002, Sarker and Itoh 2003, Kurian 
and Dietz 2004, Fujie et al. 2005). These papers however generally analyze factors 
affecting the emergence of collective action rather than its impact on performance. 
Given the methodological difficulties in measuring collective action (Meinzen-dick et al. 
2004, Poteete and Ostrom 2004), it is sometimes even studied by analyzing its 
outcome (i.e. performance), assuming there is a direct relationship between both. In 
practice, this is not necessarily so. First, performance might be affected by several 
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other factors, such as the type of irrigation infrastructure (Horst 1999). Second, in the 
scope of governance of common-pool resources, collective action contains usually 
multiple aspects, and the same goes for performance. It is then possible that different 
aspects of collective action affect different aspects of performance. In turn, factors 
affecting the emergence of collective action might as well differ for each of its aspects. 
 
The Office du Niger in Mali irrigates 80 000 ha and is one of the largest irrigation 
schemes of West Africa. The principal crop is flooded rice cultivated during the rainy 
season, with transplanting being the common practice for crop establishment. 
Institutional reforms, accompanied by physical rehabilitation of infrastructure, led to 
irrigation management transfer to farmers at tertiary level. Farmers are now collectively 
responsible for water supply to the tertiary block, water allocation within the tertiary 
block, coordination of the cropping calendar, and infrastructure maintenance. All of 
these are matters of collective action, and can have consequences on irrigation 
performance.  
 
Up to date, water is not scarce in the irrigation scheme, so that demand is virtually 
unrestricted. First, especially during the rainy season, water availability in the Niger 
River, which supplies the irrigation scheme, is abundant. Second, head works have 
spare capacity, being built in the scope of a substantially larger irrigated area. Finally, 
tertiary canals are over-dimensioned with respect to peak irrigation requirements 
because of reasons related to canal construction. Furthermore, the entire irrigation 
network is continuously filled with water and supply is on-demand. The abundant water 
supply easily leads to over consumption. In particular, without coordination of water 
supply and demand at tertiary block level, the tertiary intake is often left open when 
water demand has halted, with excess irrigation water choking the drainage system. 
Despite the abundant water supply, temporary shortage can occur in periods of supply 
problems at secondary level or peak aggregate water demand. The capacity covers 
largely the peak water requirement on a weekly basis, but canal intakes are designed 
such that only about one fifth of field canals can irrigate simultaneously at their design 
capacity. In absence of coordination, often more field canals are opened so that the 
water level in the tertiary canal drops, resulting in irrigation problems. Regarding the 
cropping calendar, with water being permanently available, farmers can decide 
independently on transplanting dates. Stretching of the growing season at the level of a 
tertiary block on the one hand diminishes the scope for congestion of the tertiary 
irrigation canal, but can lead to conflicts between irrigation and drainage. Furthermore, 
when a basin filled with water neighbors a drained basin, the latter is often refilled 
through lateral seepage. Tertiary infrastructure maintenance is necessary in order to 
avoid degradation of the canal bed and banks, which diminishes its capacity and 
makes overflow through breaches likely. In severe cases, excessive flooding of fields 
results in yield loss.  
 
A number of rules aimed at introducing coordination of all of these aspects are 
stipulated in the joint contract negotiated between the Malian state, the Office du Niger 
and farmer representatives. Furthermore, at tertiary block level, an elected canal chief 
must organize collective action and supervise compliance with the rules. As they are 
not backed by a formal sanctioning system, many canal chiefs do not perform their 
assigned task and rules are often not respected. In practice, collective action does 
emerge on some tertiary block and for some aspects of water management. When it 
does, it is in a very informal way and depends heavily on farmers’ awareness of the 
benefits of collective action and the capacity of one or more group members to 
establish a consensus on certain rules or activities. As a result, observed levels of 
collective action vary greatly among tertiary blocks.  
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Based on empirical evidence from the Office du Niger, this paper aims to quantify the 
impact of collective action on irrigation performance at tertiary level of the irrigation 
scheme in a comprehensive way. This implies two distinct objectives. First, an attempt 
is made to measure the different aspects of both collective action and performance 
through devising indicators. Second, their relation is analyzed using statistical models.  
 
METHODS 
 
1. Description of the study area 
 
The Office du Niger manages five administrative zones that are dominated by a dam 
on the Niger River from which irrigation water is conveyed through abandoned river 
channels to a hierarchic irrigation network composed of primary, secondary and tertiary 
canals. A village accommodates the farmers of the downstream plots of one to three 
nearby secondary canals. The tertiary canals serve tertiary blocks, of which 3 218 exist 
in the five administrative zones together. In a tertiary block, field canals deliver water to 
the rice basins and if required, evacuate it to a hierarchic drainage network. All 
irrigation and drainage canals are unlined. Each farmer owns several neighboring 
basins constituting a plot with an average total surface of two hectares. Allocation of 
plots is such that field canals are often shared by two or three farmers.  
Yearly rainfall varies from 300 to 600 mm and is concentrated in the months from 
July to September. The main rice-growing season sets off at the end of May with the 
installation of seedbeds. Rice transplanting begins gradually by mid-June and 
continues until the end of September. The peak irrigation demand falls during the 
month of September, when over ninety percent of the cultivated surface is irrigated and 
the rainy season reaches its end. The first fields are harvested already by mid-
September and harvesting continues until the end of December. 
 
2. Indicators of irrigation performance 
 
In the scope of this paper, performance is defined as the discrepancy between 
objectives and results (Dia 1993). The objectives of water management typically 
depend on the viewpoint of different actors (Plusquellec et al. 1994). Since different 
aspects of collective action can have different impacts on different aspects of 
performance, this paper aims at evaluating irrigation performance from the perspective 
of both the irrigation scheme’s management and its farmers. The management’s 
objectives are clearly stated in the joint contract and consist in maximizing rice 
production while minimizing water input (Office du Niger 2002, 2005). A study on 
farmers’ perception of water management in the Office du Niger revealed that from 
their point of view, the objectives of water management are being able to irrigate easily 
at all moments and with a minimum of social conflicts (Bastiaens 2005). To irrigate 
easily implies an adequate, timely, reliable and readily available water supply to every 
individual plot. This corresponds well to the findings of similar studies in other irrigation 
schemes (Manor and Chambouleyron 1993, Naik and Kalro 2000, Abernethy et al. 
2001). Based on these objectives, four performance indicators are developed: irrigation 
efficiency, easiness of irrigation, occurrence of conflicts and agricultural productivity. 
 
2.1 Irrigation efficiency 
 
Many indicators have been developed that measure irrigation efficiency by 
comparing irrigation requirements to delivery (for example Clemmens and Bos 1990, 
Molden and Gates 1990, Burt and Styles 1999). In this paper, we use the indicator 
proposed by Molden and Gates (1990).  
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The indicator divides the volume of water required (QR) by the water delivered (QD) 
of a certain subregion (R) during a certain period (T) and is a measure for the excess of 
water delivered in comparison with the requirements. The indicator takes a maximum 
value of one, with decreasing values indicating a lower efficiency. Irrigation efficiency is 
calculated for each tertiary block, and thus provides a measure for losses in the tertiary 
canal as well as at plot level. The period (T) covers the months June to October. Since 
water can be stored in the rice basins, shortage of delivery at one moment can be 
compensated for by excess delivery on a previous moment. Therefore, water 
requirement and delivery are calculated over intervals of one month. Calculation 
methods for QR and QD are explained in Vandersypen et al. (2006).  
 
2.2 Agricultural productivity 
 
A second indicator is agricultural productivity, expressed as tons of paddy harvested 
per hectare. This indicator is measured at plot level, which is the basic unit of 
production. Since farmers know the number of bags of paddy harvested on their field, 
and with one bag containing on average 75 kilos, the indicator was assessed trough a 
questionnaire survey on the total cultivated surface and the total number of bags 
harvested. In the process of harvesting, some of the rice is lost during transportation 
and threshing. This method thus probably implies an underestimation of agricultural 
productivity compared to the method applied by the Office du Niger, who samples 
unharvested rice. However, it is sufficient in the scope of a comparative analysis. 
 
2.3 Easiness of irrigation 
 
Even though water supply is mostly adequate at tertiary block level (Vandersypen et 
al. 2006), irrigation might still be problematic at plot level when water is unevenly 
distributed within the tertiary block. With no flow measurement structures available at 
plot level, conventional irrigation performance indicators based on flow data are not 
suitable. An obvious alternative is to assess directly the opinion of farmers (Svendsen 
and Small 1990), but few scholars of irrigation performance have attempted to do this 
in a systematic and quantitative way. Sam-Amoah and Gowing (2001) and Ghosh et al. 
(2005) calculated the utility of water delivery services from farmers’ perspective using 
fuzzy set theory to analyze their responses concerning the provided service. Since 
responses are noted down as linguistic expressions, this method is however time-
consuming, which limits the sample size under budget and time constraints. Abernethy 
et al. (2001) quantified farmer’s opinions on water services by asking them to indicate 
the level of agreement or disagreement with a set of statements. The authors assert 
that for the method to work best, the set should be kept as small as possible and 
preferably not contain more than 15 statements. The scope for obtaining detailed 
information on the various aspects of irrigation performance is thus limited.  
 
In this research, it is aimed to quantify the easiness of irrigation in a simple indicator 
and to supplement it with more detailed information about its determining factors so 
that the results can be fully understood. From a preparatory survey with 43 farmers 
from the study area, it appeared that the easiness of irrigation from farmers’ 
perspective encompasses two distinct aspects. The first is the occurrence of irrigation 
problems, and the second is the application of strategies to mitigate those problems. 
For each of these aspects, different features can be distinguished, consisting in the 
various causes of irrigation problems and the various strategies respectively.  
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This approach implies a more detailed survey. In order to combine a large sample 
size with detail, a new method was developed. Farmers were surveyed using a closed-
question survey with scaled responses. The performance indicator is derived from the 
key question ‘Has irrigation been easy?’ A three-point answer scale (‘always’, ’mostly’, 
‘never’) accompanied the question. The first two categories were further combined in 
order to obtain a dummy variable and facilitate statistical analysis. Several formulations 
of the key question were included at various parts in the questionnaire so that answers 
could be crosschecked for inconsistency. The questionnaire furthermore assessed the 
occurrence of irrigation problems and the application of strategies to mitigate them. 
Both the duration or frequency and the intensity of the inconvenience for each of the 
features composing irrigation problems and strategies applied were rated on a three-
point scale.  
 
2.4 Occurrence of conflicts 
 
Irrigation can be a source of conflict in case of competition for water within a tertiary 
block, over-use of water causing excess water to spill over in neighboring fields or 
when irrigation and drainage coincide in the same field canal. For farmers in the study 
area, averting conflicts is an important objective of water management. In the region, 
people are however reluctant to admit they were involved in a conflict, so it is difficult to 
obtain concrete and reliable information on the topic. Therefore, it was chosen to 
compile a simple yes/no-indicator for the occurrence of conflicts at a tertiary block. 
Farmers could then be asked questions about the occurrence of conflicts on irrigation 
management at their tertiary block without discussing their personal involvement. 
Several questions were added in the questionnaire survey to address this subject. 
Answers from the survey were completed with information obtained in group-
discussions (see further), informal interviews with individual farmers and observations 
on the field. When at least one of the sources revealed that conflicts occur on a tertiary 
block, the indicator was put to one. 
 
3. Indicators of collective action 
 
In this paper, collective action is defined following McCarthy et al. (2004) as ‘the act 
of internalizing negative externalities and/or the generation of positive externalities in 
the use of natural resources’. It manifests itself in certain events or activities or the 
coordination of these and the rules-in-use that institutionalize them (Poteete and 
Ostrom 2004). Indicators developed in this paper measure this manifestation for all 
aspects of collective action at tertiary level in the Office du Niger, which are 
coordinating the cropping calendar, maintenance of tertiary infrastructure, coordination 
of water demand at tertiary level and water allocation within the tertiary block. 
 
3.1 Coordination of the cropping calendar 
 
A relatively uniform cropping calendar is considered to be in the common interest of 
the tertiary block. Still, planting dates at individual plot level are in part determined in 
function of economic profit (early harvested rice yields high prices), physical constraints 
(lower located plots have to be transplanted early in order to prevent drowning of 
seedlings when the rainy season sets off) or financial or labor constraints (which forces 
farmers to postpone transplanting). Farmers make thus a trade-off between personal 
constraints and benefits and the common interest. The indicator to evaluate 
coordination of the cropping calendar is the standard deviation of transplanting dates. 
Through fortnightly monitoring of the transplanted surface, the transplanting date of 
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each basin is estimated. Standard deviations are weighed against the surface 
transplanted for each date. 
 
3.2 Maintenance of tertiary infrastructure 
 
Maintenance of the tertiary infrastructure consists in periodic and regular 
maintenance and is performed through farmers’ physical labor. Periodic maintenance 
implies dredging the canal bed and reinforcing the canal banks. It is considered too 
heavy a task for physical labor and the need for periodic maintenance is not pressing 
since infrastructure is recently rehabilitated. Consequently, neglect is pervasive. 
Regular maintenance consists in cleaning the canal bed of aquatic weeds and is 
executed more or less frequently depending on the tertiary block. The maintenance 
level of tertiary irrigation canals is evaluated through fortnightly observations 
throughout the growing season. Since most often, farmers clean the canal section 
adjacent to their field independent from each other, maintenance levels can differ 
considerable in time and space. Therefore, every canal section in between two field 
canals, the maintenance level is scored on a scale from 1 (good) to 3 (bad). Scores are 
then averaged for the canal and for the growing season to obtain a single result.  
 
3.3 Water allocation within the tertiary block 
 
Since most of the time, water availability in the tertiary canal covers aggregate 
irrigation demand, free access to water is the common practice. In periods of peak 
aggregate water demand or water crisis at secondary level, rules are sometimes 
devised that coordinate water allocation and avoid crowding. In a more general way, on 
tertiary blocks where allocation rules are successfully applied, farmers accept the 
principle that their access to water can be restricted in favor of the common interest, 
which facilitates coordination of water allocation also outside periods of peak demand. 
A first indicator of collective action concerning water allocation is therefore a dummy 
variable ‘rules on water allocation’ indicating whether yes or no rules are applied, taking 
into account compliance and the availability of sanctions to ensure their effectiveness. 
On some tertiary blocks where rules on water allocation are not (effectively) applied, 
informal consultation to resolve irrigation problems on the spot is however 
institutionalized. Through this consultation, temporary agreements can be made 
between two or more farmers of a tertiary block regarding water allocation. A second 
indicator, ‘consultation on water allocation’ also a dummy variable, is therefore devised 
to assess whether yes or no, informal consultation is institutionalized. Both indicators 
are assessed through group discussions and crosschecked with informal individual 
interviews and regular observations on the field. 
 
3.4 Coordination of water supply and demand at tertiary block level 
 
Coordination of water supply and demand at tertiary block level consists in tuning 
water supply to the tertiary block at all moments to aggregate demand. When such 
coordination takes place, usually, an influential farmer has taken the responsibility to 
collect information on water demand of fellow farmers, or the latter, when leaving the 
field, inform the first when water is required. The collective action indicator is a dummy 
variable indicating whether yes or no, coordination takes place and is based on results 
from group discussions, crosschecked with informal individual interviews and regular 
observations in the field.  
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4. Data collection 
For practical reasons, a clustered sampling method was applied. Nine villages were 
selected in the rehabilitated area of the administrative zones Niono and N’Debougou. 
In each of the villages, four tertiary blocks were picked ad random, so that the total 
sample size of tertiary blocks is 36. Agricultural production was evaluated for the total 
number of plots within the sample of tertiary blocks (299). Easiness of irrigation was 
evaluated for a sub-sample of 150 plots within the sample of tertiary blocks. Plots were 
selected ad random, but such that at least one third of plots per tertiary blocks are 
represented. Summary data on the selected villages and sample are presented in 
Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Summary data on the selected villages and sample (Number between 
brackets represent data for the sampled tertiary blocks) 
Village 
Secon-
dary 
canal 
Number 
of tertiary 
blocks 
Irrigated 
surface (ha) 
Number of 
plot holders 
Number of 
plot holders 
per tertiary 
block 
Average 
plot size 
(ha) 
Moussa Werè KL0 26 (4) 479 (105) 94 (45) 3.6 (11.3) 5.1 (2.3) 
Kouyan 
Peguena KO1 8 (4) 150 (74) 81 
(28) 
10.1 (7.0) 1.9 (2.6) 
Coloni N1 33 (4) 621 (62) 263 (45) 8.0 (11.3) 2.4 (1.4) 
Médina G5 26 (4) 509 (113) 188 (49) 7.2 (12.3) 2.7 (2.3) 
Siguivoucé S6 25 (4) 653 (62) 203 (23) 8.1 (5.8) 3.2 (2.7) 
Fassun S8 17 (4) 300 (75) 103 (28) 6.1 (7.0) 2.9 (2.7) 
Medina-Coura B3 34 (4) 759 (58) 208 (20) 6.1 (5.0) 3.6 (2.9) 
Tiemedeli-Coura B5 34 (4) 451 (65) 208 (34) 6.1 (8.5) 2.2 (1.9) 
Kanasakko BE3 20 (4) 239 (49) 222 (27) 11.1 (6.8) 1.1 (1.8) 
Total for sample villages 223 36 4161 (663) 1570 (299) 7.0 (8.3) 2.7 (2.2) 
Total for rehabilitated area 
of Niono and N'Debougou 
1042 20 736 6184 5.9 3.4 
 
For the calculation of the indicators, daily flow rates were measured at the intake of 
each tertiary block. Additionally, fortnightly observations were done to monitor 
transplanted and harvested surfaces and evaluate the maintenance level of the tertiary 
canal. For the questionnaire survey, the responsible farmer for each plot of the sample 
was contacted for a one-to-one interview. 150 farmers of the sub-sample of plots were 
presented the complete questionnaire, and 149 a shortened version with only 
questions on agricultural productivity. A first version of the questionnaire was 
constructed in French and translated in the local language, Bambara, using the 
translation-back-translation method (Brislin et al. 1973). This version was adapted after 
a testing phase using the techniques described in Foddy (1993). Two trained 
interviewers administered the survey. Separate group discussions with three to six 
participating farmers took place per tertiary block. Discussions were animated by the 
researchers using a flexible interview guide and assisted by an interpreter. Finally, 
triangulation methods were used to validate and complete results from indicators of 
both collective action and irrigation performance through informal interviews with 40 
plot-holders from the sub-sample and regular observations on the field. Data collection 
for the calculation of the indicators was done for the growing season of 2004. Informal 
interviews and observations took place throughout 2004 and 2005.  
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5. Statistical analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics on the indicators of irrigation performance and collective action 
are generated and mutual correlations within both groups are tested using non-
parametric tests. The impact of collective action on irrigation performance is assessed 
through simple or binary logistic regression models, depending on whether the 
dependent variable is a scale or dummy variable. The hypothesis tested is that with 
increasing levels of collective action, performance will improve. The independent 
variables are the indicators of collective action, which are all measured at tertiary block 
level. The dependent variables are the performance indicators, of which two are 
measured at tertiary block level and two at plot level. In the latter case, all units of the 
same tertiary block share the same independent variables. Statistical analyses are 
performed with the SPSS computer package. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
1. Irrigation performance 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the indicators. Average irrigation efficiency 
is 0.59, a value that is considered low according to the standards put forward by 
Molden and Gates (1990). Losses are due to excess water delivery to tertiary blocks 
compared to demand and to excess application to the fields. Variability in irrigation 
efficiency is however large, ranging from 0.23 to 0.87 and with a standard deviation of 
0.18. Agricultural productivity was recorded for 294 out of 299 farmers, since five 
farmers from the sample could not be located. Reported yields, on average 3.8 t/ha, 
show also a great variability. They range from 0 t/ha, for two farmers who’s crop was 
devastated by floods, and 6.5 t/ha. From the survey on easiness of irrigation, 11 cases 
were excluded because of inconsistencies in the answers. A vast majority (86 %) 
judges irrigation always or mostly easy, implying that on the whole, their primary 
objective concerning water management is met.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for indicators or irrigation performance and collective 
action 
Indicator Descriptive Number of observations 
Irrigation performance   
Irrigation efficiency-average [St. Dev] 0.59 [0.18] 36 
Agricultural productivity-average [St. Dev] (t/ha) 3.8 [1.2] 294 
Easiness of irrigation-% always or mostly easy 86 % 139 
Occurrence of conflicts-% yes 53 % 36 
Collective action   
Standard deviation of planting dates-average [St. Dev] 
(days) 18 [6] 36 
Tertiary infrastructure maintenance-average [St. Dev] 1.62 [0.35] 36 
Rules on water allocation-% yes 19 % 36 
Consultation on water allocation-% yes 53 % 36 
Coordination of water supply and demand-% yes 31 % 36 
 
Nevertheless, irrigation problems do occur (Table 3). About 64 % is confronted with 
irrigation problems, and the frequency and/or duration and intensity are considered 
rather high. On the other hand, three quarters of that group mentions only one type of 
problem, which might explain why in general, irrigation is still deemed easy. Next, 
about 91 % of interviewed farmers apply one or more strategies to mitigate irrigation 
problems, with a frequency and/or duration that are rather high. The intensity of the 
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disturbance is however scored quite low. Among the factors determining easiness of 
irrigation, some relate to aspects external to the tertiary block, such as water supply at 
secondary level, and have thus no connection with collective action. Nevertheless, the 
problems and strategies mentioned most frequently do consider collective action 
problems. Indeed, among the problems, high aggregate water demand at tertiary level 
primes. Given that peak water requirements at tertiary block level are largely met by 
supply, this indicates a failing in coordination of water allocation. Likewise, the most 
frequently applied strategies are to negotiate access to water with other users, and to 
stand guard to prevent the latter from interrupting irrigation, which can also be avoided 
through coordinating water allocation. Finally, on about half of the tertiary blocks, 
conflicts on water management occur. From the informal interviews and group 
discussions, it appeared however that many grades exist as to the frequency, 
seriousness and duration of conflicts. The dummy indicator might thus be too crude a 
measure for adequately assessing conflicts. 
 
Table 3. Details for factors determining easiness of irrigation 
Particular 
Times 
mentioned 
(%) 
Average score for 
frequency/duration1 
Average 
score for 
intensity1 
Type of irrigation problem    
Low water availability at secondary level 26 0.67 0.74 
Unfavorable topographic position of the 
field 14 0.68 0.80 
High aggregate water demand at tertiary 
level 33 0.58 0.66 
Other 9 0.63 0.72 
Total 64 0.64 0.73 
Strategy to mitigate irrigation problems    
Contact water bailiff to send more water 23 0.81 0.57 
Clean the tertiary canal 9 0.89 0.67 
Stand guard to the field so that other 
water users cannot interrupt irrigation 71 0.88 0.42 
Negotiate access to water with other 
water users 79 0.86 0.39 
Total  0.86 0.51 
1 For those who mentioned the problem or strategy; put on a scale of 0 to 1, with a higher score indicating a higher 
frequency/duration and intensity 
 
Most performance indicators are not mutually correlated ( 
Table 4), meaning that the various aspects of performance vary independently from 
each other. This implies also that the impact of collective action can be different for the 
various aspects of performance. Easiness of irrigation and the occurrence of conflicts 
are the exception. The probability that farmers judge irrigation never easy is 
significantly larger on tertiary blocks where conflicts occur. Indeed, irrigation problems 
are often a source of conflict. 
 
Table 4. Correlations among indicators of irrigation performance 
 Irrigation efficiency Easiness of irrigation Occurrence of 
conflicts 
Easiness of 
irrigation 
Mann-Whitney = 832.5;  
p = 0.059 
  
Occurrence 
of conflicts 
Mann-Whitney = 131.5;  
p = 0.346 
Pierson χ² = 4.926; 
df = 1; p = 0.026 
 
Agricultural 
productivity 
Spearman’s ρ =-0.018; 
p = 0.761 
Mann-Whitney = 1096; p 
= 0.922 
Mann-Whitney = 
9564.5; p = 0.650 
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2. Collective action 
 
The period in which transplanting takes place on a tertiary block ranges from one to 
more than three months. In an extreme case, some fields were already being 
harvested on the moment others were transplanted. On most tertiary blocks, 
transplanting takes place within two months, with often a concentration in one or two 
decades, translating in an average standard deviation of planting dates of 18 days 
(Table 2). Even though farmers believe that it is important to have their cropping 
calendars more or less in line within a tertiary block, transplanting dates are thus rather 
dispersed. The average score for tertiary infrastructure maintenance is 1.62. The 
standard deviation is 0.35 and scores range from one, for the perfectly maintained 
canals, to only 2.06, whereas the maximum score is three. The fact that most canals 
have a score around the average is that variation in maintenance level within a canal is 
rather large. In addition, all of the canals are more or less well maintained on at least 
some sections. A good score for tertiary infrastructure maintenance does however not 
always reflect farmers’ efforts. Some canals of the sample have not yet been colonized 
by certain weeds, so that regular maintenance is hardly necessary. On about one third 
of tertiary blocks, water supply and demand are coordinated. Rules on water allocation 
within the tertiary block are effectively applied on about one fifth of tertiary blocks from 
the sample, and on half of them, informal consultation is institutionalized. This leaves 
almost one third of tertiary blocks where water allocation is not coordinated at all.  
 
Table 5. Correlations among the indicators of collective action 
 Spread of planting 
dates 
Tertiary 
infrastructure 
maintenance 
Rules on water 
allocation 
Consultation on 
water allocation 
Tertiary 
infrastructure 
maintenance 
Spearman’s ρ = 
0.081; p = 0.639 
   
Rules on 
water 
allocation 
Mann-Whitney = 
79.0; p = 0.368 
Mann-Whitney = 
76.5; p = 0.325 
  
Consultation 
on water 
allocation 
Mann-Whitney = 
131; p = 0.346 
Mann-Whitney = 
160.5; p = 0.975 
  
Coordination 
of water 
supply and 
demand 
Mann-Whitney = 
70; p = 0.020 
Mann-Whitney = 
125.5; p = 0.685 
Pierson χ² = 
1.084; df = 1; p = 
0.298 
Pierson χ² = 
0.749; df = 1; p = 
0.387 
 
Again, the various aspects of collective action are not correlated (Table 5), which 
implies that that tertiary blocks with high levels of collective action for one aspect are 
not necessarily better off to attain the same for other aspects. As an exception, tertiary 
blocks where the opening of the tertiary canals is coordinated show a significantly 
smaller standard deviation of planting dates. Rather than a causal relation between 
these two, there is probably a third factor, such as the number of farmers on the tertiary 
block, which determines both. This is however not further investigated in the scope of 
this paper.  
 
3. Impact of collective action on irrigation performance 
 
Table 6 to Table 9 present the results of the regression models predicting irrigation 
efficiency, agricultural productivity, easiness of irrigation and the occurrence of conflicts 
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as a function of collective action. The results are quite different for each of the models, 
which is logic since few of the performance indicators are mutually correlated. Irrigation 
efficiency can be explained best by the indicators of collective action. The most 
significant variable in the model is coordination of water supply and demand, with 
higher efficiencies when such coordination occurs. Then follow the standard deviation 
of planting dates and consultation on water distribution, while the effect of the other 
variables is not significant. The coefficients for the standard deviation of planting dates 
and consultation on water allocation indicate that increasing levels of collective action 
result in lower efficiency. The effect is however small, and at best suggests that 
collective action on the cropping calendar and water allocation cannot improve 
irrigation efficiency. The probability that irrigation is always or mostly easy and that 
conflicts occur, are only for a small part determined by the indicators of collective 
action. Easiness of irrigation is related to coordination of water allocation within the 
tertiary block. Where consultation and particularly rules on water allocation are present, 
the probability of irrigation problems decreases significantly. In fact, all except one of 
the farmers indicating irrigation is never easy are located on tertiary blocks where no 
such rules are applied. This result suggests that by increasing collective action for 
water allocation, irrigation problems at the individual level can be solved. In the model 
predicting the occurrence of conflicts, the standard deviation of planting dates and 
application of rules on water allocation have the largest effect, even though not 
significant. Finally, the model predicting agricultural productivity using indicators of 
collective action is not at all significant.  
 
Table 6. Results of simple regression model predicting irrigation efficiency; R²=0.44; 
n = 36 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients Variable 
B S.E. Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 0.581 0.168  3.460 0.002 
Spread of planting dates 0.011 0.004 0.395 2.691 0.012 
Average maintenance level tertiary 
canal -0.109 0.072 -0.216 -1.500 0.144 
Rules on water allocation -0.055 0.073 -0.125 -0.757 0.455 
Consultation on water allocation -0.134 0.057 -0.387 -2.375 0.024 
Coordination of water supply and 
demand 0.186 0.057 0.494 3.260 0.003 
 
 
Table 7. Results of simple regression model predicting agricultural production; 
R²=0.01, p = 0.576, n = 294 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Variable 
B S.E. Beta 
t Sig. 
Constant 4.483 0.540  8.308 0.000 
Spread of planting dates -0.001 0.013 -0.004 -0.071 0.943 
Average maintenance level tertiary 
canal -0.267 0.233 -0.070 -1.146 0.253 
Rules on water allocation -0.161 0.197 -0.058 -0.816 0.415 
Consultation on water allocation -0.257 0.161 -0.110 -1.600 0.111 
Coordination of water supply and 
demand -0.064 0.171 -0.023 -0.375 0.708 
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Table 8. Results of logistic regression model predicting the probability that irrigation 
is always or mostly easy; Nagelkerke R² = 0.15; % correctly predicted = 86; 
n = 139 
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant 1.104 2.209 0.250 0.617 3.018 
Spread of planting dates -0.035 0.048 0.543 0.461 0.965 
Average maintenance level tertiary 
canal 0.275 0.986 0.078 0.780 1.317 
Rules on water allocation 2.568 1.102 5.427 0.020 13.044 
Consultation on water allocation 1.158 0.553 4.391 0.036 3.183 
Coordination of water supply and 
demand 0.436 0.655 0.443 0.505 1.547 
 
 
Table 9. Results of logistic regression model predicting the probability that conflicts 
occur; Nagelkerke R² = 0.18; % correctly predicted = 67; n = 36 
Variable B S.E. Wald Sig. Exp(B) 
Constant -1.315 2.520 0.272 0.602 0.268 
Spread of planting dates 0.101 0.067 2.221 0.136 1.106 
Average maintenance level tertiary 
canal -0.016 1.104 0.000 0.988 0.984 
Rules on water allocation -1.522 1.141 1.780 0.182 0.218 
Consultation on water allocation 0.024 0.859 0.001 0.978 1.024 
Coordination of water supply and 
demand -0.276 0.839 0.109 0.742 0.759 
 
An important implication of these results is that when studying collective action, the 
choice of indicators is important, especially when the objective is to formulate 
recommendations on how to enhance collective action. Focusing on aspects that 
matter less for performance can waste valuable time and resources. In the Office du 
Niger irrigation scheme, the aspects of collective action that stand out are coordination 
of water supply and demand and water allocation within the tertiary block, which have 
an impact on irrigation efficiency and easiness of irrigation respectively. Given the rapid 
rate of expansion of the irrigated area, water might become a limiting factor in the near 
future, so that irrigation efficiency gains importance. In addition, when using less water 
at tertiary block level, the proportion of farmers facing irrigation problems when 
allocation is not coordinated might also increase. Coordination of water supply and 
demand and water allocation within the tertiary block should thus be the primary focus 
when enhancing collective action. Until now, most programs are directed towards 
tertiary infrastructure maintenance. Indeed, neglect of maintenance easily strikes the 
eye, but it matters less for irrigation performance in the over-dimensioned canals of the 
Office du Niger. Similarly, the stretching of the cropping calendar is often cited by 
farmers and the irrigation scheme’s management and field staff as a primary cause for 
low irrigation performance, but the relation is not confirmed in this research.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper investigated the impact of collective action on irrigation performance at 
tertiary level in the Office du Niger irrigation scheme. Performance is measured using 
indicators that take into account the perspective of both farmers and managers of the 
irrigation scheme and are irrigation efficiency, agricultural productivity, easiness of 
irrigation and the occurrence of conflicts. Indicators of collective action measure its 
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implication in practice and are coordination of the cropping calendar, tertiary 
infrastructure maintenance, coordination of water allocation and coordination of water 
supply and demand at tertiary block level. The main conclusion is that not all aspects of 
performance are affected by collective action, and when they do, not by all aspects of 
collective action. The choice of indicators when studying collective action is thus of 
primary importance. In the Office du Niger, coordination of water supply and demand 
and coordination of water allocation affect efficiency and easiness of irrigation 
respectively. Given the increasing importance of these aspects of performance, they 
must form the primary focus of efforts to enhance collective action. 
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